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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2405
___________
ANTHONY BODNAR,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civil No. 1-15-cv-02013)
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 13, 2015
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 18, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Anthony Bodnar, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.
In 2009, Bodnar was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia of receipt and possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to
an aggregate term of 168 months in prison. Bodnar did not file a direct appeal. In 2011,
Bodnar filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District
Court denied the motion on the merits. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit denied Bodnar’s request for a certificate of appealability.
In 2015, Bodnar filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
District of New Jersey. Bodnar claimed that a Magistrate Judge presided over his plea
hearing in violation of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The District
Court ruled that Bodnar’s claim is not cognizable under § 2241 and dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court noted that § 2255’s savings clause, which
allows a prisoner to pursue a claim under § 2241 where the remedy under § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective,” did not apply. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error.
Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
As recognized by the District Court, “[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are
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the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or
sentences. . . .” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A habeas
petition raising such a challenge under § 2241 may not be entertained unless a § 2255
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the petitioner’s
detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. We have stated that a § 2255
motion is inadequate or ineffective “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some
limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a
full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.
We have applied this savings clause only in the unusual case where a petitioner
had no prior opportunity to challenge a conviction for a crime that an intervening change
in substantive law might have negated. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1997). This is not the case here. Bodnar does not claim that he is factually or legally
innocent based on new authority. Rather, he relies on a recent appellate decision to
support his claim of a statutory violation regarding the procedure used in his case. As
Bodnar recognizes, he is unable to satisfy the requirements for filing a second or
successive § 2255 motion. However, he may not invoke § 2241 merely because he is
unable to file such a motion. Id.
Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.

3

